Georgia Long Arm Statute: Six Grounds, Due Process, Defenses

Georgia’s Long Arm Statute, codified at O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, lets a Georgia court assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident only when that person or entity has done one of six specific things: transacted business in Georgia, committed a tort in Georgia, caused in-state injury through out-of-state conduct combined with certain ongoing Georgia contacts, owned or used Georgia real property, maintained a matrimonial domicile in the state, or become subject to modification or enforcement of a prior Georgia court order. Unlike states with catch-all long arm statutes, Georgia requires the plaintiff to clear a statutory hurdle before the constitutional due process question is even reached.¹

The Six Grounds, One by One

Each ground stands on its own. A plaintiff needs to satisfy only one, but the lawsuit has to arise from the specific conduct the ground describes.²

Transacting any business in Georgia. The broadest ground. The Georgia Supreme Court reads this language to reach the full extent of due process, so a single purposeful transaction can be enough when the claim arises out of it. Physical presence is not required.
Committing a tort in Georgia. Wrongful acts or omissions occurring within the state supply jurisdiction, again to the constitutional limit. Defamation is carved out of this ground entirely.
Causing injury in Georgia through conduct outside the state. Tighter conditions apply. The nonresident must also regularly do or solicit business in Georgia, engage in a persistent course of conduct in the state, or earn substantial revenue from goods used or services provided here.
Owning, using, or possessing real property in Georgia. When the claim arises from that real estate connection, jurisdiction follows.
Maintaining a matrimonial domicile in Georgia. For divorce, annulment, separate maintenance, and support actions, the nonresident either maintained a marital home in Georgia when the case was filed or resided in the state before the action began. The statute makes clear that cohabitation is not required.
Being subject to a prior Georgia court order. If a Georgia court has already entered an order for alimony, child custody, child support, property division, or debt apportionment, it retains jurisdiction to modify or enforce that order against the nonresident. For modification, the moving party must reside in Georgia; for enforcement, the moving party’s domicile doesn’t matter.

The matrimonial-domicile ground does not replace or reduce Georgia’s separate residency requirement for filing a divorce. That’s a different prerequisite that still has to be met on its own.

Who Counts as a Nonresident

O.C.G.A. § 9-10-90 defines the term broadly. A nonresident is any individual who was not residing or domiciled in Georgia when the cause of action arose, and any partnership, association, or commercial entity not organized or existing in the state at that time. For corporations, it means one neither organized under Georgia law nor authorized to transact business in the state when the claim arose.³

The definition also catches people and companies that leave. Someone who was a Georgia resident when the underlying events occurred but who has since moved out of state still qualifies as a nonresident under the statute, and can still be served under it.³

Statute First, Due Process Second

Georgia is an enumerated-acts state. The General Assembly’s own classification places it in that category rather than with states like California or Texas, whose long arm statutes reach as far as the federal Constitution allows.¹ In Georgia, the statute has to fit first. Only then does the court ask whether exercising jurisdiction would satisfy due process.

Two Georgia Supreme Court decisions set the boundaries. In Gust v. Flint, the court dismissed a case brought by a Georgia buyer against Wisconsin sellers because the sellers had never entered Georgia, did no regular business there, and had no persistent course of conduct in the state. The court declined to stretch the statute past its listed acts, holding that “an out-of-state defendant must do certain acts within the State of Georgia before he can be subjected to personal jurisdiction.”⁴

Eighteen years later, Innovative Clinical & Consulting Services v. First National Bank of Ames refined that approach with a literal, subsection-by-subsection reading. Subsections (1) and (2), which contain no limiting language, extend to the full reach of due process. Subsection (3) does not: its explicit conditions on out-of-state conduct causing in-state injury cannot be bypassed even if the Constitution might otherwise allow broader jurisdiction.⁵

The practical result: for business transactions and torts committed in Georgia, the analysis effectively collapses into a due process inquiry. For out-of-state conduct causing in-state injury, the statutory requirements are a real, independent obstacle.

The Defamation Exclusion

The tortious-act ground in subsection (2) does not cover defamation. A plaintiff suing a nonresident for libel or slander cannot rely on the fact that a defamatory statement caused harm in Georgia. The claim has to fit another ground, usually subsection (1) if the defendant transacts business in the state.² Missing this carve-out is a common way defamation cases against out-of-state defendants get dismissed.

Registered Corporations and General Jurisdiction

The six grounds all produce specific jurisdiction, meaning jurisdiction limited to claims connected to the listed conduct. General jurisdiction is broader: a court with general jurisdiction can hear any claim against the defendant, related or not. For corporations, general jurisdiction traditionally lies in the state of incorporation and the state of the principal place of business.

Georgia adds another route. In Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. McCall, the Georgia Supreme Court held that a foreign corporation authorized to transact business in Georgia is subject to the general jurisdiction of Georgia courts, even when the lawsuit has nothing to do with the company’s activities in the state.⁶ The consent is implicit rather than spelled out in any statutory notice, a point the court acknowledged while stating that its ruling would provide notice going forward. Any company weighing registration in Georgia should factor this in.

Serving a Nonresident

Jurisdiction without proper service is jurisdiction the court cannot exercise. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-94 allows a nonresident subject to the Long Arm Statute to be served outside Georgia in the same manner as service inside the state. Service can be made by any person authorized under the laws of the place where service occurs, or by a qualified attorney or equivalent legal professional there.⁷

This is separate from other specialized service statutes. The Nonresident Motorist Act at O.C.G.A. § 40-12-1 applies to accidents on Georgia highways and is strictly construed on its own terms; do not assume the Long Arm Statute’s service procedure substitutes for it.⁸

Where to File

Venue in a Long Arm case lies in the county where a substantial part of the business was transacted, where the tortious act or injury occurred, or where the real property is located, under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-93.⁹ When a plaintiff sues a Georgia resident and a nonresident together over the same transaction, the nonresident can be joined in the county where the resident defendant is suable. If the resident defendant is dismissed before trial, the case against the nonresident transfers to a county where venue is otherwise proper rather than being dismissed.

Defenses a Nonresident Can Raise

A defendant served under the Long Arm Statute has real options.

Minimum Contacts and Due Process

Even when a plaintiff satisfies one of the six grounds, the court’s exercise of jurisdiction still has to comport with what the U.S. Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington called “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”¹⁰ The defendant must have purposefully directed activities toward Georgia. Accidental or one-sided contacts initiated by the plaintiff generally will not do. Once the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing on jurisdiction, the defendant carries the burden of proving that exercising it would violate due process.

Failure to Fit a Statutory Ground

Because Georgia is not a maximum-authority state, a defendant can win by showing the conduct doesn’t match any of the six grounds, regardless of what due process might allow in the abstract. Gust v. Flint is the clearest example: the sellers might have had enough contacts to satisfy a broader constitutional standard, but they had done none of the acts listed in § 9-10-91 within Georgia, and that ended the inquiry.⁴

Forum Non Conveniens

Even when jurisdiction is proper, a Georgia court can decline to hear the case if another forum would be more appropriate. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-31.1 directs the court to weigh access to evidence, availability of witnesses, administrative burden, local interest in the dispute, and the deference owed to the plaintiff’s choice of forum. If the better forum is out of state, the case is dismissed; if it’s a different Georgia county, the case is transferred.¹¹

Online and Out-of-State Digital Conduct

There is no separate provision for internet-based jurisdiction. Georgia courts apply the same six grounds and the same due process analysis to websites, email, and online transactions as they do to any other conduct. The question is whether the nonresident purposefully directed digital activity toward Georgia residents.

An interactive site that lets Georgia customers place orders, or a business that targets Georgia consumers with advertising, is more likely to fall within the statute’s reach than a passive informational page that happens to be accessible in the state. What matters is whether the defendant deliberately reached into Georgia through the internet, or merely maintained a presence the plaintiff found there.

1
Georgia General Assembly. Understanding Georgia’s Long Arm Statute
2
Justia Law. Georgia Code 9-10-91 – Grounds for Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresident
3
FindLaw. Georgia Code Title 9 Civil Practice 9-10-90
4
Justia Law. Gust v Flint
5
Justia Law. Innovative Clinical and Consulting Services v First Nat Bank
6
Justia Law. Cooper Tire and Rubber Co v McCall
7
Justia Law. Georgia Code 9-10-94 – Service
8
Justia Law. Georgia Code Title 40 Chapter 12 – Actions Against Nonresident Motorists
9
FindLaw. Georgia Code Title 9 Civil Practice 9-10-93
10
Justia Law. International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310 (1945)
11
Justia Law. Georgia Code 9-10-31.1 – Forums Outside This State; Waiver of Statute of Limitations Defense