In Illinois v. Bradley Yohn, a Sangamon County jury convicted Bradley Yohn of home invasion, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated vehicular hijacking, and aggravated criminal sexual assault for a violent 2021 attack on a 77-year-old woman. Judge Roger Thomson sentenced him to 130 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections on September 25, 2023. Yohn represented himself at trial and is now pursuing post-conviction motions through an attorney.
What Happened on November 9, 2021
Prosecutors alleged that Yohn and a co-defendant, Karen Blackledge, targeted an elderly woman in her home, robbed and assaulted her, and fled in her vehicle. The victim was 77. She died roughly a month after the attack, before the case reached trial.
Blackledge did not go to trial. She pleaded guilty and received 20 years for home invasion and 20 years for aggravated criminal sexual assault, running consecutively for a total of 40 years. The State had charged her with the sexual assault under an accountability theory, meaning she was alleged to have facilitated Yohn’s conduct rather than committed the act herself.1Illinois Courts Audio. People v. Blackledge, 2023 IL App (4th) 220746-U
The Convictions
On July 17, 2023, the jury found Yohn guilty on every major count. Each of the four central offenses is a Class X felony under Illinois law, the most serious classification short of first-degree murder, carrying a base term of 6 to 30 years with no probation available.2Illinois General Assembly. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25
- Home invasion, based on entry into the victim’s home while she was present and arming himself inside with a dangerous weapon.3Illinois General Assembly. 720 ILCS 5/19-6
- Aggravated kidnapping, based on the secret confinement of the 77-year-old victim.4Illinois General Assembly. 720 ILCS 5/10-2
- Aggravated vehicular hijacking, based on taking the victim’s vehicle by force while armed.5Illinois General Assembly. 720 ILCS 5/18-4
- Aggravated criminal sexual assault, based on a sexual act committed by force while displaying or threatening to use a dangerous weapon. That subsection adds a mandatory 10-year enhancement on top of the Class X range.6Illinois General Assembly. 720 ILCS 5/11-1.30
He was also convicted of residential burglary.7Justia Dockets & Filings. Yohn v. Adams County Jail 3:2023cv03179
Why the Sentence Is 130 Years
Judge Thomson imposed the maximum on each Class X count and the mandatory enhancement on the sexual assault count, then stacked them. The breakdown:
- Home invasion: 30 years
- Aggravated kidnapping: 30 years
- Aggravated vehicular hijacking: 30 years
- Aggravated criminal sexual assault: 40 years (30-year maximum plus the mandatory 10-year weapon enhancement)6Illinois General Assembly. 720 ILCS 5/11-1.30
The terms run consecutively, not concurrently. That stacking was not a discretionary choice by the judge. Illinois law requires consecutive sentencing when a defendant is convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault alongside other felonies, and the mandatory consecutive provision also applies when a Class X conviction involves severe bodily injury.8Illinois General Assembly. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4
Then there is Illinois truth-in-sentencing. For offenses on the state’s listed violent crimes, defendants must serve at least 85 percent of their prison terms and can earn no more than 4.5 days of credit per month. Aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping are directly listed; home invasion and aggravated vehicular hijacking fall under the 85-percent rule when the court finds the offense caused great bodily harm.9Illinois General Assembly. 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3 At that rate, Yohn would have to serve roughly 110 years before release becomes possible, which makes 130 years a functional life sentence. A three-year term of mandatory supervised release follows any Class X sentence upon eventual release.2Illinois General Assembly. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25
Yohn Represented Himself at Trial
Yohn invoked his right to self-representation, a right the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Faretta v. California. A defendant may defend himself without a lawyer so long as he makes the choice voluntarily and with awareness of what he is giving up; the court need not confirm he has any actual legal skill.10Justia. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)
The court appointed a public defender as standby counsel, available for procedural questions but not running the defense. Yohn delivered his own opening and closing, cross-examined witnesses, and raised his own objections. His conduct in the courtroom was frequently disruptive, with outbursts that at times led to his removal. Faretta itself noted that the right to self-representation “is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom.”10Justia. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)
Two evidentiary features of the trial stand out. First, because the victim had died before trial, her account reached the jury through prior statements. Under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause and Crawford v. Washington, prior testimonial statements from an unavailable witness are admissible only when the defendant had an earlier opportunity to cross-examine her.11Legal Information Institute. Right to Confront Witness Second, Yohn personally cross-examined Blackledge, who testified after pleading guilty. Illinois’s pattern jury instruction tells jurors that accomplice testimony “is subject to suspicion and should be considered by you with caution” and must be “carefully examined in light of the other evidence in the case.”12Illinois Courts Audio. Jury Instruction 3.17 – Testimony of an Accomplice Conducting that cross without legal training was a significant handicap.
Where the Case Stands Now
After sentencing, Yohn retained attorney Mark Wykoff, who filed a motion for a new trial and a motion to reconsider the sentence. Both have gone through amended versions. As of early 2025, Judge Thomson was expected to issue a written decision on the new-trial motion, with a hearing on the sentence-reconsideration motion scheduled for March 2025.
The new-trial motion raises an ineffective-assistance theory, which is a difficult argument for a defendant who represented himself. Faretta states directly that a defendant who makes that choice “cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of ‘effective assistance of counsel.'”10Justia. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) The motion appears aimed at standby counsel’s performance and at specific judicial rulings rather than at Yohn’s own work. Most courts that have faced this theory have rejected it, reasoning that because there is no constitutional right to standby counsel, there is no constitutional yardstick for how standby counsel must perform. Whether either motion succeeds will turn on identifying concrete errors that plausibly changed the outcome, a hard standard to meet when the defendant chose to try the case himself.