The Massachusetts long arm statute, codified at Chapter 223A, Section 3, lets state courts hear lawsuits against out-of-state people and businesses, but only when the defendant’s connection to Massachusetts fits one of eight specific categories listed in the statute and only when the lawsuit also satisfies constitutional due process. Both pieces have to be in place. A plaintiff who clears the constitutional bar can still lose if the claim does not fit the statute’s language, because the Supreme Judicial Court has made clear the two tests are not the same.
The Eight Grounds That Open the Door
If your case against a non-resident does not fit at least one of these categories, the court never reaches the constitutional question. The grounds in Section 3 are:
- Transacting any business in Massachusetts (§ 3(a)), the broadest and most commonly invoked ground.
- Contracting to supply goods or services in the state (§ 3(b)).
- Causing injury by an act or omission in Massachusetts (§ 3(c)).
- Causing injury in Massachusetts by an act or omission outside the state (§ 3(d)), which carries an additional requirement: the defendant must also regularly do business here, actively solicit Massachusetts customers, or derive substantial revenue from goods or services consumed in the state.
- Owning, using, or possessing real property in Massachusetts (§ 3(e)).
- Contracting to insure a person, property, or risk located in Massachusetts at the time of contracting (§ 3(f)).
- Maintaining a domicile in Massachusetts while party to a relationship that gives rise to a claim for divorce, alimony, property settlement, child support, or custody (§ 3(g)).
- Being subject to a Massachusetts family law order that one party now seeks to modify or enforce, even if the other party has since left the state (§ 3(h)).
The claim must arise from the qualifying contact. A defendant who owns a vacation home on Cape Cod can be sued here over a dispute involving that property, but the real estate interest alone will not support an unrelated breach-of-contract claim.
The Two-Step Test: Statute First, Then Due Process
Massachusetts courts run personal jurisdiction in two stages. First, the plaintiff must show the claim fits one of the eight grounds in Section 3. Second, the court independently confirms that exercising jurisdiction would satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires the defendant to have “minimum contacts” with Massachusetts and demands that the lawsuit not offend basic fairness.
Here is the point that trips up litigants from other jurisdictions: the Massachusetts long arm statute is not coextensive with what due process allows. The Supreme Judicial Court said so expressly in SCVNGR, Inc. v. Punchh, Inc., correcting earlier suggestions to the contrary. A plaintiff can meet the constitutional test and still lose on jurisdiction because the claim does not squarely fit the statutory language. The two-step inquiry is real, not a formality.
The plaintiff carries the burden of establishing jurisdiction. If you cannot show how the defendant’s conduct fits one of the eight grounds and how that conduct meets the minimum contacts standard, the case can be dismissed before it starts.
Minimum Contacts and Purposeful Availment
The constitutional floor comes from International Shoe Co. v. Washington: the defendant must have minimum contacts with the state such that being sued here does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
The core idea is purposeful availment. The defendant must have deliberately reached into Massachusetts in a way that invokes the benefits and protections of the state’s laws. A company that markets to Massachusetts consumers, sends employees here for meetings, or signs contracts with Massachusetts businesses has purposefully availed itself of the state. Random or unilateral contact initiated by the plaintiff usually does not count.
Foreseeability alone is not enough. The U.S. Supreme Court has stressed that a defendant cannot be dragged into a forum simply because it was foreseeable the product or conduct might eventually affect someone there. In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, a plurality held that placing a product into the stream of commerce, without more, does not amount to purposeful conduct directed at a particular state. Something extra is required: designing a product for that market, advertising there, or building a distribution channel aimed at state consumers.
The Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc. shows the standard in action. A Massachusetts resident slipped and fell at a California hotel. The injury itself happened in California, yet the court found jurisdiction under Section 3(a) because the hotel had solicited conference business from Massachusetts organizations, sent registration materials to Massachusetts residents, and accepted the plaintiff’s reservation by phone while she was in Massachusetts. Deliberate outreach aimed at the state’s market was enough. “But for” that solicitation, the plaintiff would never have been at the hotel.
Specific Versus General Jurisdiction
Specific jurisdiction applies when the lawsuit arises directly from the defendant’s contacts with Massachusetts. The eight grounds in Section 3 are specific jurisdiction provisions: the claim must grow out of the transaction, tort, or property interest connecting the defendant to the state. Most long arm cases live here.
General jurisdiction is far more demanding. It allows any claim against a defendant regardless of whether the claim relates to the state. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Daimler AG v. Bauman that general jurisdiction over a corporation exists only where the company is “essentially at home,” which for practical purposes means its state of incorporation or principal place of business. An individual is subject to general jurisdiction where they are domiciled. Outside those narrow situations, general jurisdiction is almost never available.
Online Business and the Massachusetts Market
Simply running a website that Massachusetts residents can visit does not create jurisdiction. Courts look for evidence that the defendant targeted Massachusetts or cultivated business here, not that someone in Massachusetts happened to click.
Jurisdiction has been found where a non-resident business maintained an active commercial relationship with a Massachusetts customer through recurring online interactions: filling orders shipped to Massachusetts, sending regular newsletters and advertisements to Massachusetts addresses, and building a purchase history with a state resident. That pattern of deliberate, repeated outreach moves beyond passive web presence into purposeful availment. A static, informational site is unlikely to create jurisdiction on its own.
Cross-Border Torts
When the wrongful act happens outside Massachusetts but the injury lands here, Section 3(d) can reach the defendant, with tighter requirements than in-state torts under Section 3(c). The plaintiff must also show the defendant regularly does business here, solicits Massachusetts customers, or earns substantial revenue from goods or services consumed in the state. A one-off interaction that happens to cause harm here is not enough.
In Murphy v. Erwin-Wasey, Inc., the First Circuit addressed a foreign corporation that mailed a fraudulent misrepresentation into Massachusetts. The court held that knowingly sending a false statement into a state, intending reliance that will injure a state resident, counts as acting within the state for jurisdictional purposes. It would ignore modern business realities, the court said, to treat sending a messenger with a fraudulent statement as jurisdictional conduct while treating a mailed one as something less.
Serving a Non-Resident Defendant
Jurisdiction is only half the problem. You also have to serve the defendant properly. Section 6 of Chapter 223A lays out five methods for serving a non-resident:
- Personal delivery in the same manner used for in-state service.
- Service according to the law of the state or country where the defendant is physically located.
- Any form of mail that requires the defendant’s signature on delivery.
- Letter rogatory, used mainly when the defendant is in another country.
- Any method the court specifically orders.
Proof matters. When you serve by mail, you need either the signed receipt or other evidence of personal delivery the court finds satisfactory. Sloppy proof can derail a case even when jurisdiction is otherwise solid. If the defendant is in a country that is party to the Hague Service Convention, that treaty generally governs how documents must be transmitted, translation is often required, and the process can take months. Ignoring those requirements can invalidate the service.
How Federal Courts in Massachusetts Apply the Statute
Diversity cases filed in federal court in Massachusetts borrow the state’s long arm statute. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A) provides that service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant “who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located.” A federal court sitting in Massachusetts runs the same two-step analysis of statutory reach and due process a state court would.
One narrow exception: for claims arising under federal law, Rule 4(k)(2) allows jurisdiction over a defendant who is not subject to any single state’s general jurisdiction, as long as exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the U.S. Constitution. This federal long arm provision comes up rarely, typically for foreign defendants with contacts scattered across many states.
Defenses the Non-Resident Can Raise
The most direct defense is arguing that the claim does not fit any of the eight grounds in Section 3, or that the defendant’s contacts are too thin to satisfy due process. Isolated or accidental contacts rarely support jurisdiction. A single letter, one phone call, or an incidental shipment into Massachusetts is almost never enough without a broader pattern.
Even when minimum contacts exist, a defendant can argue that exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Courts weigh the burden on the defendant, the state’s interest in resolving the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in relief here, and the overall efficiency of this forum.
Section 5 of Chapter 223A also gives Massachusetts courts the power to stay or dismiss a case when “substantial justice” calls for it to be heard elsewhere. This is forum non conveniens. A defendant invoking it must usually show an adequate alternative forum exists and that private factors (access to evidence and witnesses) and public factors (local interest, choice of law) weigh against keeping the case here. Courts have broad discretion and can attach conditions to any dismissal.
Do Not Miss the Rule 12(h)(1) Deadline
This is where defendants most often make an irreversible mistake. Under Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(1), the personal jurisdiction defense is waived if it is not raised in the very first responsive pleading or motion. File an answer without including the defense, or move to dismiss on other grounds without also challenging jurisdiction, and the defense is gone permanently. Unlike subject-matter jurisdiction, which can be raised at any time, personal jurisdiction is a use-it-or-lose-it defense.
Two other situations foreclose the defense entirely. Individuals served while physically present in Massachusetts are subject to jurisdiction regardless of minimum contacts analysis. And defendants who consent, whether through a forum selection clause or by voluntarily appearing without objection, are bound.